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The impacts of air-pollution motivated automobile 
consumption tax adjustments of China 
Abstract  
A concomitant of the rapid development of the automobile industry in China is the 
serious air pollution and carbon dioxide emission. There are various regulation 
instruments to reduce the air pollution from automobile sources. China government 
chooses a small-displacement oriented consumption tax as well as fuel tax to alleviate 
the worse air pollution. This paper evaluates the effects of both policy instruments on 
fuel consumption and social welfare. Our empirical results show that fuel tax 
decreases the total sale of new cars, which leads to a decline of total consumption of 
fuel from the new cars, but does not change the sale distribution over various fuel 
efficiency models; while consumption tax adjustment results in a skewed sale 
distribution toward more efficient new cars but increases the total consumption of fuel 
due to an enlarged sale. The effects of these two taxes on pollution depend on our 
assumption about the average fuel efficiency of outside goods. On the other hand, 
consumption tax leads to less social welfare loss; in particular, consumer surplus 
decreases in an order of magnitude less than that caused by fuel tax. Fuel tax actually 
transfers more welfare from private sector to the government. 
Key words:  China auto industry, welfare analysis, tax incidence, BLP model, tax 
progressivity 
I. Introduction  
China automobile industry has developed rapidly in the last two decades. In 2009, 
China overtook the United States as the biggest auto market; the passenger car sales 
soared to 10.3 million and total vehicle sales were estimated at 13.6 million. However, 
a concomitant of the rapid development of the automobile industry in China is the 
serious air pollution and carbon dioxide emission. China topped the list of sovereign 
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states and territories by carbon dioxide emissions 2007 provided by the CDIAC for 
the United Nations. Its emission accounts for 22.3% of the global total, while 
emissions from motor vehicles have become the main source of air pollution in 
China’s large- and medium-sized cities, according to China Vehicle Emission Control 
Annual Report 2010 by the Ministry of Environmental Protection. This report shows 
that the volume of pollutants generated by motor vehicles across China in 2009 
amounted to 51.4 million tons, with cars contributing most of it. Furthermore, Walsh 
(2000) estimates that mobile sources are contributing approximately 45–60% of the 
NOx emissions and about 85% of the CO emissions in typical Chinese cities. 
China government has realized the serious problem of air pollution and carbon 
dioxide emissions, and formulated policies to increase energy conservation initiatives 
and pollution control projects. In particular to reduce automobile emissions, China 
Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation adjusted consumption 
tax on vehicles twice on Apr 1st, 2006 and Sep. 1st 2008, respectively (Table 1). In 
short, these policy adjustments raise the consumption tax on passenger vehicles with 
high displacement and cut the consumption tax on low-emission passenger vehicles. 
Obviously, the purpose of this adjustment is to curb high-emission cars and promote 
small ones, in an effort to reduce pollution and save energy. The current tax is similar 
to the gas guzzler tax in the States, while the difference is it is paid by consumers.  
This paper investigates the effectiveness of these adjustments in tax scheme on total 
consumption of fuel and fleet average fuel efficiency, using comparative statics ex 
ante and post tax adjustments 2 . Previous studies show that an effective 
emission-reducing policy may be costly (Crandall 1992, Greene and Liu 1988, 
Crandall and Graham 1989, Kleit 1990 about Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFÉ) and fuel tax, White 1982 and Bresnahan and Yao 1985 about air-pollution 
standards of the Clean Air Act). Therefore, we apply Berry, Levinson and Pakes (1995, 
                                                              
2  Harrington (1997) shows that better fuel economy can strongly contribute to lower emissions of CO and 
hydrogen carbonate. Therefore, most of the literatures use the average fuel economy to measure the 
effectiveness of alternative policies on reducing emissions. This paper follows this measurement standard. 
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BLP hereafter) methodology to China automobile industry data to estimate the social 
welfare loss as a measurement of the consumption tax cost, and compare its 
effectiveness and cost to that of a hypothetical fuel tax3. Our study shows that neither 
consumption tax nor fuel improves fuel efficiency significantly, but the consumption 
tax lowers market share weighted average fuel consumption in a bigger magnitude 
than fuel tax does. More importantly, fuel tax decreases the total sale of new cars, 
which leads to a decline of total consumption of fuel from the new cars, but does not 
change the sale distribution over various fuel efficiency models; while consumption 
tax adjustment results in a skewed sale distribution toward more efficient new cars but 
increases the total consumption of fuel due to an enlarged sale. The effects of these 
two taxes on environment depend on our assumption about the average fuel efficiency 
of outside goods. On the other hand, consumption tax leads to less social welfare loss; 
in particular, consumer surplus decreases in an order of magnitude less than that 
caused by fuel tax. Fuel tax actually transfers more welfare from private sector to the 
government. In conclusion, fuel tax is more likely to lower the total consumption of 
fuel, sacrificing more social welfare on new cars. On the contrary, consumption tax 
only improves the new-car fleet average fuel efficiency, but enlarges total 
consumption of fuel the total sale with a moderate decrease of social welfare.  
The effectiveness of emission-reduction policies have been discussed for a long time. 
Most extant literatures compare the tax policies such as fuel tax (Dahl 1979, Parry and 
Small 1995, Fullerton and Gan 2005, Feng, Fullerton and Gan 2005, Bento et al 2009), 
and other more stringent non-tax regulations such as CAFÉ (Crandall 1992, Koopman 
1995, Agras 1999, West 2004, Sterner, Dahl and Franzén 1992). Although ambiguous 
conclusions have been drawn on their effectiveness, most studies found that fuel tax is 
more efficient in decreasing the Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT), while CAFÉ is 
efficient in improving the average fuel economy of new cars4. But few empirical 
studies to date have estimated the environmental and welfare effect of an excise tax 
                                                              
3  Fuel tax adjustment was effective in January 2009, but our sample period ends in December 2008, so such a 
fuel tax adjustment is hypothetical. Based on the price for 93# gasoline in the mass market, the tax rate is about 
30%.   
4  Parry and Small (2005) also conclude that fuel tax causes greater shifts in fuel economy than VMT reduction. 
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on the car. China’s automobile consumption tax is such a Pigovian excise tax. Tax 
rates vary in car displacement of engine. This tax is not as stringent as CAFÉ. 
Manufacturers do not need to restrict their average fuel efficiency; instead, they can 
choose to share some tax burdens to sustain their market shares. In this way, 
manufacturers partially internalize the marginal social cost of less fuel efficiency, 
rather than downsize the cars to satisfy the compulsory requirement5. Therefore, this 
tax may be a better policy to solve the safety issue caused by CAFÉ. This paper is the 
first study to empirically investigate the efficiency and cost of this tax.   
This paper differs from the previous studies in the following aspects. First, China’s 
automobile consumption tax on displacement is unique; no related literature has 
investigated the consequence of this tax. It sets different tax rates over displacement 
tiers. So tax payment is based on both displacement tiers and car values. Fullerton, 
Gan and Hattori (2004) studied a similar annual automobile tax levied by prefecture 
government of Japan. Japanese automobile tax is a fixed amount tax based on 
displacement, not varying over car value, which results in a regressive tax scheme for 
each displacement tier since high-income households purchasing more expensive cars 
just need to pay the same tax. But whether the consumption tax with progressive tax 
rates over displacement actually has the property of progressivity merits empirical 
measurement.  
Second, this paper simultaneously estimates the impacts of tax adjustment on both 
demand and supply sides, while most empirical studies to date have focused on the 
demand side estimation (Greene and Liu 1988, Bento et al 2009, West 2004). BLP 
(1995) framework models the price competition between manufacturers, so it can be 
used to analyze the profit variation as well as consumer surplus changes due to 
exogenous tax changes, which makes this study capable of estimating the total social 
welfare changes rather than consumer surplus changes only.  
                                                              
5  Downsizing may cause serious safety problem and results in higher costs for a regulation policy. Greene and Liu 
(1988) find that for a gallon fuel saving, the welfare loss is $0.3; Crandall and Graham (1989) estimate that welfare 
losses per gallon is $0.41~0.63 considering the safety issue caused by downsizing due to CAFÉ. 
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Third, the current empirical model in this study endogenizes the response of the 
equilibrium automobile prices to tax changes. The previous research usually ignores 
this while studying the effectiveness of emission-reduction policies (Fullerton, Gan 
and Hattori 2004, West 2004). Since firms are heterogeneous in their costs, they may 
respond quite differently to a tax policy change. Firms with lower productivity have to 
forward all the tax addition to consumers, while those with higher productivity can 
absorb some tax burden to sustain sales. Without considering the competition effect 
on car prices status quo, the consumer welfare changes due to a tax change may be 
under-estimated6. Welfare and environmental consequence analysis in this paper take 
account of this equilibrium price change, so my study gives a more precise estimate.  
Besides, this paper investigates the tax incidence. Without considering the supply side 
tax burden sharing effect, we may overestimate the welfare loss on the demand side 
due to a tax change. Also, this paper tries to measure the progressivity of this 
consumption tax, and makes a comparison to the fuel tax.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly introduces the 
automobile industry and the consumption tax system in China, and describes the data 
for the empirical model, which is laid out in section III. Section IV presents the 
empirical results and welfare analysis. Finally, section V summarizes this paper.  
II. Description of the automobile industry and tax adjustments 
China automobile industry  
In the last two decades, China automobile industry has been in rapid development. By 
the end of 2009, the vehicle population in China is 62 million, and the new car sale for 
2009 is 13.6 million, which makes China the largest auto market in the world7. The 
development of this industry is asymmetric; in particular, the market share of 
passenger vehicles has increased from 8.3% in 1990 to 75.7% in 2009, while the 
                                                              
6  For example, Petrin (2002) estimates that gains from increased price competition due to the entry of Minivan 
may explain 43 percent of total consumer benefits.   
7  News release Sep. 4th, 2010, National development and reform commission of China.   
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market share of trucks declined from 52.8% to 16.5%, which reflecting a switch of 
this industry toward private cars8.  
The automobile industry of China is highly competitive. There are 171 manufacturers 
in this market and the total market share of the largest 5 firms accounts for 66.1 
percent of sales in 2008 (see Table 2 for details). Among the top ten manufacturers, 
eight are joint-ventures with foreign car makers such as Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedes 
Benz, General Motors, Hyundai, Nissan, Honda, Toyota etc. Local brand only 
accounts for 25.92% of the market in 2008. Figure 1 displays the cooperation 
structure of China automobile market. The complex market structure and the nature of 
multi-ownership for the top manufacturers make it difficult for them to collude with 
each other. A strategic competition framework can model this market properly.  
Our empirical analysis focuses on the light-duty passenger vehicle market, consisting 
of sedan, MPV, and SUV. This market accounts for 75.3% of the industry output of 
China. Most of the productions are for domestic consumption. The export of 
light-duty passenger vehicle is .24 million in 2008, which is less than 4.8% of the total 
production9. The import is about .15 million, which is negligible.  
The consumption tax system and fuel tax 
The final payment on a car includes three categories of tax in china: consumption tax, 
value added tax and vehicle purchases tax. These taxes are levied on manufacturers, 
retailers, and consumers respectively, although almost all taxes will be forwarded to 
consumers finally. Consumption tax started from 1994, targeting on goods with high 
values or resource consuming. The tax rates vary over the displacement tiers. Value 
added tax has been fixed at 17% since 1993 for the entire retailing sector. Vehicle 
purchase tax has also been fixed at 10% since 2001 until 2010 for all tiers of 
passenger vehicles. The computation for these three taxes is given below, 
                                                              
8  China Automotive Industry Yearbook 2010.   
9  Annual report on automotive industry in China 2009. 
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(1+ ) (1+ ) = 
(1+ )
m c r
m c v
p t t p
Vpt p t t

   
Where, ct , vt  and rt  are tax rates for consumption, vehicle purchase, and value 
added tax respectively. mp  is the manufacture price, p is the list price, and Vpt  is 
the extra vehicle purchase tax consumers have to pay on top of the list price. Since 
vehicle purchase and value added tax rates do not vary over different car models, and 
stay unchanged over time, so we ignore their impact in our study.  
Fuel tax took effect in January 2009, after 15 years debate on it since 1994. In the 
1990s, National People's Congress rejected proposals to use fuel tax to replace the 
road toll, which is collected by local governments. Local governments were 
concerned that they would lose out financially. Since 2000, implementation of fuel tax 
has been delayed because of sharp rises in the international oil price, with 
policymakers expressing concern that the tax will increase inflation. As air pollution 
has become a significant concern in China, the government finally decided to 
implement the fuel tax, aimed at facilitating energy saving and emission cut as well as 
the economic structural adjustment. 
Therefore, both tax adjustments target on emission reduction, but their effectiveness 
has never been investigated. We will use the following empirical method to analyze 
their effects on environment and measure their social costs.  
III. Empirical model and estimation method 
Empirical framework 
Consumers are assumed to choose a car from N models to maximize their utilities. 
The indirect utility function for consumer i purchasing product j is as follows,  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) _
i i i i
j ge ge ge j pw pw pw j wg wg wg j
i i i
p p p ge j br j j j
u const v GE v POWER v WEIGHT
v inc PRICE BR DUM
     
     
      
       
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This indirect utility function assumes that consumers will make comparison in 
characteristics of the cars in their choice set. Some key car features, such as 
horsepower (POWER), weight, price, fuel efficiency and the place of origin of their 
brands (BR_DUM) are observable, while other features are not. So, we use j  to 
indicate those features consumers will consider while making purchase decision, but 
are not observable in my data, and assume it follows a distribution with mean zero. 
Given the fact that consumers usually evaluate fuel efficiency in the way of 
expenditures on gas, it is assumed that their utility depends on gas expenditure (GE) 
which is the product of fuel consumption and the gas price measured in Chinese 
currency RMB yuan/liter, rather than fuel efficiency. By its construct, GE records 
consumers’ expenditure on gas for a hundred-kilometer drive. If the average driven 
distance for a representative consumer is standardized to 100 kilometers per year, GE 
actually measures the total expenditure of a representative consumer on gasoline per 
year. Since consumers are heterogeneous in their driving patterns, we take into 
account this difference using variable gev , which is the ratio of an individual’s 
idiosyncratic driven distance to the mean level. Similarly, individuals have 
idiosyncratic tastes on the other product characteristics, we denote these taste 
variations on power, weight, and price using ipwv ,
i
wgv , and 
i
pv  respectively. Model 
parameters  , ,     describe consumer’s preference on the car characteristics. 
Finally, we assume the idiosyncratic consumer taste ij  follows a traditional type I 
extreme value distribution; therefore, the probability for consumer i to choose product 
j is given as,  
 
0
, ,
i
j
i
k
u
i i
ij j N
u
k
eS x v inc
e




, where jx  is a vector of all product characteristics. 
And the market share for product j is given as,  
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   , , , ( ) ( )i ij j ij j
B
S x S x v inc dP v dP inc         (1) 
where, B is the set of consumers whose idiosyncratic tastes and income drive them to 
purchase product j.  
On the supply side, manufacturers conduct differentiated Bertrand competition, so the 
profit maximization problem for manufacturer f producing fJ models can be 
formalized as,  
   max ( ) ,1f jf j j jp j J j
p
mc MS x
t


     
Here, market size M is constant. Since car models with different displacement are 
exposed to different tax rate jt , so the net income for manufacturers is  1 j j
p
t . The 
marginal cost jmc  does not change in output, but it varies across different car models, 
so it is a function of product characteristics jw ,  
ln( )j j jmc w     
Since this function is in the log-linear form, so the parameters   indicate the 
percentage change of marginal costs due to a particular car characteristic change.  
The first order condition of the profit maximization problem gives the following 
equation,  
ln( ( , , )) ln
(1 )
j
j j j j
j
p
x t mc w
t
            (2) 
where, ( , , )j x t   is the markup of product j, and it should be a function of demand 
side variables, parameters and taxes for all car models. Equation (1) and (2) give rise 
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to the equilibrium conditions in the market. 
Estimation issues 
We apply GMM estimation method proposed by BLP (1995) to estimate the 
parameters in equation (1) and (2) simultaneously. In short, we use the observed 
market share to recover the mean utility in equation (1), which is a function of 
consumers’ mean preference , the observed product characteristics, and unobserved 
product characteristics j . Then, our moment condition is ( , ) 0( )E Z
  
 
        
, 
where Z is a set of instrumental variables described below. For the details of this 
method, readers can refer to BLP (1995). We will only discuss some important issues 
involved in the estimation process.  
An important issue of this method is the computation of aggregate market shares. 
Following Nevo (2001), we make ns random draws from standard normal distribution 
to simulate the idiosyncratic consumer tastes, and make the same amount of random 
draws for a vector of household income and annual driven distance from a survey data. 
These random values are used to calculate the conditional choice probability for each 
individual, and then the unconditional market shares are derived using the average of 
the individual market shares given by    
1
1, , ,
ns
i i
j j ij j
i
S x S x v inc
ns
 

  .  
Another issue is the choice of instrumental variables for the endogeneity problem of 
the price. In this study, we use three sets of instrumental variables: the product 
characteristics, the sum of corresponding characteristics over all the firms’ other 
models, and sum of product characteristics over other firms’ car models in a market. 
Nevo (2001) shows that these are valid instrumental variables which are independent 
of the unobservable characteristic terms but correlated with prices.  
Finally, given the estimates of structure parameters, we use compensating variation 
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(CV) to calculate consumer surplus changes due to tax changes. For a logit discrete 
choice model on the demand side, Nevo (2000) shows that CV can be calculated as 
follows,  
, ,
0 0
1
ln{ exp } ln{ exp }
( )
N N
i i
j post j prens
j j
i i
i p p p ge
u u
MCV
ns v inc  
 


  
   
IV. Data and summary statistics 
This section describes three main sources of data used in this paper: 1) monthly car 
model sales from China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM); 2) 
product attributes collected from Car Market Guide; and 3) consumer demographic 
characteristics from a survey conducted to vehicle owners in Beijing by Guanghua 
School of Management at Beijing University of China in 2005. The summary 
statistics are listed in Table 3 - 4, respectively.  
Households’ income is reported as categorical data in interval scales as listed in Table 
5. We use the average of each interval to represent the income of consumers falling 
into that interval. For the first and last interval, we choose RMB 1,000 and 100,000 
respectively. In this way, the average household income corresponding to the mean 
statistics in Table 3 amounts to RMB8,300 per month10. The average distance 
travelled per year by Beijing car owners is about 22,000 kilometers, and 60% of the 
drivers travelled less 11 . This supports our intuition that the main purpose of 
purchasing a car is for daily commute in China. Therefore, the driving pattern is 
relatively inelastic to some exogenous shocks such as fuel price changes. These 
survey data are used to simulate the consumers in the China auto market. Considering 
the computation burden, we finally randomly draw a thousand vectors of these two 
variables to represent individuals’ demographic information.  
                                                              
10  The average household income is RMB4395 per month in Beijing 2005 (National Statistics Bureau of China). 
Given the fact that the survey targets on vehicle owners, this statistic is reasonable.     
11  Another survey conducted in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Jinan and Hangzhou 2005 by Sinotrust, which is a 
leading consulting firm in China, shows that the 66.7% consumers mainly use car for business travel or daily 
commute from home to working place.   
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Product features are reported by Car Market Guide. We define a car model by the 
product characteristics including brand and the following model features. Horsepower 
is measured by Kilo-watts. jWEIGHT  is the logarithmic of the car weight measured 
in Kilograms. Fuel consumption is a ratio given in liters/100km, which is used to 
construct the gas expenditure variable as described in the model section. 
Place-of-origin dummy variables for brands show that European, Japanese and 
American cars are most popular in China.   
Monthly sale and price data from January 2004 until December 2008 are available 
from CAAM. Since the car feature data for 2006 is missing, so we have to drop the 
sales data for 2006 in our estimation. The total sale of car models for 2008 in our 
sample is 5.49 million, which accounts for 81.3% of the total passenger vehicles sale 
in China market. To derive the market share for each car model, we set the market size 
at the number of city-households who owned a house with more than three rooms, 
published in the Fifth National Population Census (2000) by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China. This number is 17,963,39912.  
A stylized fact is most entry and exit of car models occurred in January or some 
month in the second half year. In other words, the competition structure over half-year 
interval is quite stable. Therefore, we aggregate the data into half year level and use 
the average monthly price and sale during each half year to measure their sale and 
price. In this way, we can include the truncated data and make comparison over 1297 
car models. Large variation in both sale and price is observed. The most popular car 
model has a monthly sale of over nineteen thousands, while the minimum sale is only 
12 units per month. The standard deviation in price is 123311.7, which is high relative 
to the average price of 168454.8. 
V. Empirical results 
                                                              
12  This number is arbitrary. Setting the market size at different number will mainly change estimate of the 
constant coefficient on the demand side since that will change the relative market share of each car model to the 
outside goods; however, the ratios of market share between different car models will not change.     
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In this section, we will first present the estimation results; then, we will report the 
empirical results for a counterfactual experiment to illustrate the impact of both 
consumption and fuel tax.  
A. Estimation results 
Estimates of the model parameters are listed in Table 6. All estimates for the mean 
utility function are significant with expected sign. Consumers prefer more powerful 
and larger size, but less fuel consuming cars. These findings coincide with most of the 
previous research (Bresnahan 1987, Greene and Liu 1988, BLP 1995 etc). In 
particular, the data statistic on driving distance shows that VMT is relatively inelastic 
in China; hence, it is assumed unchanged with vehicle choice and other exogenous 
factors such as fuel price. Therefore, variation of fuel expenditure on different car 
models reflects the physical difference in cars’ fuel efficiency. The negative 
coefficient of fuel expenditure shows that efficient cars are more favorable.  
On the cost side, all estimates are significant. Unlike the demand side, fuel 
consumption rather than fuel expenditure is incorporated into the marginal cost 
function. This is because cost per se only depends on the car features and production 
technology, but not on fuel prices. A negative sign indicates that a more fuel 
consuming cars costs less than a fuel efficient car. Coefficients of brand dummies are 
also positive and significant. This may imply that foreign brands invest more on 
characteristics other those included in our analysis.  
Almost all the estimates for the idiosyncratic tastes and household demographic 
variation are insignificant, implying consumers are not so different in the car features 
in our study. But consumers do show variation in their sensitivity to price, although 
the estimate for standard deviation on the tastes for price (-0.1105) is less than one 
third of that for price in the mean utility (-0.3894). Estimation results also show that 
households with higher income are less sensitive to price changes, but this effect is 
not significant.  
15 
 
B. Counterfactual experiments 
While studying the effectiveness and welfare effect of tax changes, it is necessary to 
control the market structure changes and keep technical surface unchanged pre and 
after tax changes. However, associated with tax changes, new entry of car models is 
observed. To disentangle the tax effect on the equilibrium prices and market shares 
from changes in competition environment, we conduct counterfactual experiment 
using the data for the period from September to December 2008, in which duration 
there are 252 car models in the market. We assume the market structure stay 
unchanged but tax scheme is set as before tax adjustment in April 2006, and then 
solve the equilibrium prices and market shares. Similarly, we also solve the 
equilibrium set for a scenario while gasoline is subject to a 30% fuel tax, while 
assuming consumption tax scheme unchanged.  
a). Equilibrium price analysis 
Figure 2 displays the simulated tax-inclusive price changes before and after tax 
adjustments. Apparently, the price of most fuel-efficient cars declines after 
consumption tax adjustment, while the price of those extremely fuel-consuming cars 
increases dramatically. However, similar trend is not observed for fuel tax. On the 
contrary, manufacturers of fuel-consuming cars either undercut their prices or keep 
them unchanged to compete with efficient cars after fuel tax.  
A summary of price changes is listed in Table 7. Cars are categorized into various 
groups by their fuel consumptions; then, we calculate the average price changes due 
to tax adjustments for each group. Consumption tax adjustment has embodied in the 
auto prices: the average price for efficient cars lowers since the consumption tax rate 
for this section is lowered, while the average price for fuel consuming cars increases 
due to a higher consumption tax rate. Although manufacturers have already shared 
some tax burden (we will show the tax incidence below in detail), they have no 
capability to absorb all the tax, so the final prices for inefficient cars increases by a 
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notable scale. Fuel tax causes adverse pattern in price changes. The reason is fuel tax 
affects fuel expenditures on different car models disproportionally. It raises the fuel 
cost on inefficient cars much more than the efficient models. To sustain their market 
share, the fuel-consuming manufacturers have to lower their prices. On the other hand, 
the efficient cars obtain advantage after fuel tax, so they can charge higher prices.  
b). Tax incidence 
Before investigating the impact of tax adjustments, we analyze the tax incidence first 
since this will give a rough picture about welfare transfer between consumers and 
manufacturers.   
Since the tier of tax rates is set by displacement levels, we plot the percentage change 
of tax-inclusive prices versus car displacement in Figure 3. For cars with displacement 
lower than 1.5 liters, their effective tax rate is lower after adjustment. Consequently, 
we observe a negative change in price for most car models in this category. For cars 
with displacement between 1.5 to 2.5 liters, their tax-inclusive prices are not supposed 
to change since they are exposed to barely changed tax rates. However, the intensive 
competition in this category drove the prices of most models down more or less. So, 
actually manufacturers in this segment shared some tax burdens. For cars falling into 
the category of 2.5-3, 3-4 and above 4 liters, we are supposed to see their 
tax-inclusive price to increase by 4%, 16% and 30%, respectively, if manufacturers do 
not share any tax burden. Figure 3 shows that most manufacturers for cars below 4 
liters just forwarded the tax burden to consumers directly. Only those producing large 
cars shared moderate taxes to sustain their market shares. Therefore, we expect to see 
consumers lose more than the producers from tax rate increases. 
c). Impact and welfare analysis 
The environmental effects of these two tax adjustments are expected to be different. 
Since the tax-inclusive prices benefit efficient cars in their market shares under 
consumption tax adjustment, so the market share weighted average fuel consumption 
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is expected to decrease for this case. But it is ambiguous for fuel tax since the price 
changes reversely to the fuel expenditure. We summarize the share weighted average 
fuel consumption in the first column of Table 8.   
Our results show that neither fuel tax nor consumption tax has significant effect on 
fuel efficiency13. However, the mean of fuel consumption decreased by .2% after 
consumption tax adjustment, while that for the fuel tax increased by .5%.  
An interesting finding is the total consumption of fuel under various scenarios 
displays completely opposite trend (column 2)14. Fuel tax reduces total consumption 
of fuel by 16 billion liters, while consumption tax leads to an increase by .16 billion 
liters. How to reconcile the result on fleet average fuel consumption with that on the 
total fuel consumption? To answer this question, we need to look into the definition of 
these two measurements. The fleet average fuel consumption is a sale weighted 
average fuel consumption conditional on purchase; therefore, when the realized total 
sale decreases on a relatively larger scale than the average fuel consumption does, 
then the conditional average increases. In the case of fuel tax, consumptions on all 
fuel efficiency levels have dropped after tax since the expenditure on gas go beyond 
consumers’ budgets, leading to sharp decline of total sale of cars while the sale 
distribution over fleet average fuel consumption does not change much (column 6 in 
Table 7). In the case of consumption tax, however, the decreased tax rate for the small 
displacement cars attracted more sales, leading to an increase of total sales, while the 
sale distribution skewed to efficient cars (column 5 in Table 7). Therefore, we observe 
an increase in the total consumption of fuel due to the decline of fleet size and an 
increase of average fuel consumption due to the drop off of marginal consumers under 
fuel tax, but observe completely opposite trends under consumption tax. 
A natural question is: which measurement should we use to make a judgment on the 
                                                              
13  The t‐statistic for the difference in the mean of fuel consumption between the scenario pre and after 
consumption tax adjustment is .3.   
14  We use the randomly drawn annual vehicle miles driven in our demographic data part to calculate the market 
share weighted average total consumption of fuel for each car model and then sum them up to derive this 
number.     
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policies? The answer of this question depends on the assumption of the outside goods. 
When a consumer chooses not to purchase a car in our dataset, he may choose not to 
purchase, in which case his fuel consumption is zero, or choose to purchase a used car 
or any car outside of our data, in which case his fuel consumption may be even higher. 
Given the unavailability of used car data, we calculate the thresholds of fleet average 
fuel consumption for the outside goods, which makes the total consumption of fuel 
under the scenario of both taxes adjustment indifferent to each other, using below 
equation,  
* *(1 )* * *(1 )*f f c cn o j n o j
j j
TFC AMT AFCO S M TFC AMT AFCO S M       
where, fnTFC  and 
c
nTFC  are the total fuel consumption for new cars subject to fuel 
tax and sale tax respectively (as shown in column 3), AMT  is the average distance 
traveled, AFCO  is the average fuel consumption of outside goods, (1 )fj
j
S  and 
(1 )cj
j
S  are the market shares of outside goods under fuel and consumption taxes 
respectively. Since AMT  is available from our demographic data sample, so 
AFCO  can be solved from above equation. Similarly, we solve the threshold of 
average fuel consumption for consumption tax to reduce total consumption of fuel 
relative to no-tax case.  
Figure 4 illustrates the savings in total consumption of fuel under both taxes. Our 
results show that when the average fuel consumption for the outside goods is above 
3.30 liters/100km, then consumption tax is effective to lower the total consumption of 
fuel, compared to the case without tax; when it is below 6.62 liters/100km, then fuel 
tax can save total consumption of fuel. When the average fuel consumption of the 
outside goods is below 6.55liters/100km, fuel tax works better than consumption tax 
in lowering total consumption of fuel. Intuitively, if consumers who choose the 
outside options are more likely to consume an inefficient car, then policy leading to 
less total sale of new cars will become worse even if it saves the consumption of fuel 
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on new cars. For instance, assuming the average fuel consumption for used cars is 10 
liters/100km, then only if the chance for an outside goods consumer to choose a used 
car is below 65.5% will make fuel tax more efficient than consumption tax.    
On the other side, both taxes lead to consumer welfare loss, but they are quite 
different in magnitude and welfare re-distribution (column 3-6). The welfare loss due 
to consumption tax adjustment (4 million) is about four orders of magnitude less than 
that caused by fuel tax (13.1 billion). More importantly, fuel tax leads to a consumer 
welfare loss (8.07 billion) in an order of magnitude more than the loss from a 
consumption tax (199 million). Same pattern is observed to the manufacturers’ profit, 
while the government’s tax income increases by 562 million from fuel consumption, 
even using the number of fuel tax for one year. In other words, both taxes result in 
welfare re-distribution among economic principals, but fuel tax transfers welfare from 
private sector to the government in a much larger magnitude.  
d). Tax progressivity 
Policy makers are usually concerned about the distributional effect of a tax. Most 
economists and policy makers support a progressive tax system, since ‘it is not very 
unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expense, not only in 
proportion to their revenue, but something more than in that proportion’15. To measure 
the progressivity, we construct the Lorenz curves proposed in Suits (1977). Figure 5 
illustrates the distributional effect of both taxes over household income. It shows that 
the percentage of tax burden borne by the lowest income groups is higher than their 
share of total income for both taxes, so the curves arch above the diagonal equity line, 
which is similar to the sales and excise taxes in the States shown in Suites (1977).  
Our findings coincide with West (2004) in that both consumption tax and fuel tax are 
regressive16. However, West (2004) finds that gas or miles taxes are significantly less 
                                                              
15  Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations. 
16  West (2004) concludes that fuel tax is progressive over the bottom half of the income distribution but 
regressive over the wealthiest half of the income distribution. Since our study is targeted on car owners, who 
belong to the wealthy group in China, so our findings actually support his. 
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regressive than size taxes, but our findings suggest that consumption tax based on the 
size of displacement is less regressive than the fuel tax for lower income group, and 
this relationship reverses for higher income group.     
VI. Conclusion  
We found that fuel tax is more costly than sale tax in increasing the fuel efficiency 
level because the consumption tax leverages tax payment on different displacement 
automobiles: subsidizing small displacement cars with tax income from large cars 
while fuel tax equates the marginal costs of reducing fuel consumption across all uses 
(Crandall 1992). So, the consumption tax is more efficient to induce consumers to 
choose fuel efficiency cars, making the sale distribution skewed toward efficient cars; 
while the sale distribution over fuel efficiency keeps unchanged in the case of fuel tax 
adjustment. However, fuel tax decreases the total sale of new cars, while consumption 
tax adjustment actually enlarges the total sale a little bit. Therefore, they have 
opposite effect on the total consumption of fuel. Their total effects on the environment, 
however, depend on the average fuel efficiency of the outside goods. As long as the 
portion of outside-goods consumers who finally purchase a more fuel-consuming car 
is not large, then fuel tax works better in lowering the total consumption of fuel.  
Our fairness study shows that consumption tax is less regressive than the fuel tax for 
low income consumers. Moreover, it does not reduce consumer surplus as much as 
fuel tax. But considering the externality of savings in fuel consumption, the welfare 
loss due to fuel tax should be much lower. 
However, our conclusion relies on one assumption: we assume the driving pattern will 
not change even when consumers are exposed to 30% fuel tax. Considering the fact 
that main purpose of driving in China is business transportation, the first assumption 
is reasonable. Kahn (1996) finds that “emissions reduction has occurred even though 
total vehicle miles travelled has more than doubled,” and his explanation about this 
phenomenon is that emissions fall when new-car emissions regulation becomes more 
21 
 
stringent. This also supports our assumption about travel pattern since his finding 
proved that regulation on fuel efficiency is more efficient than policies affecting 
driving patterns in reducing emissions.   
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Table 1 Adjustments of Consumption Tax Rates on Vehicles in China 
 
Effective since 
Displacement 
（L） 
≤1.0 1.0-1.5 1.5-2.0 2.0-2.5 2.5-3.0 3.0-4.0 ≥4.0 
1994 3% 5% 5% 5%-8% 8% 8% 8% 
Apr. 1st 2006 3% 3% 5% 9% 12% 15% 20% 
Sep. 1st 2008 1% 3% 5% 9% 12% 25% 40% 
 
Table 2  The market shares for top 10 manufactures in China auto industry 
 
Rank    Manufacturers    Market Share (%) 
1  SAIC(Shanghai Auto Industry Cooperation)  18.3 
2  FAW  16.3 
3  DFM(Dongfeng Motor Cooperation)  14.1 
4  CHANA(Changan Automobile)  9.2 
5  BAW(Beijing Automobile Works Co.,Ltd)  8.2 
6  GAIG(Guangzhou Auto Industry Cooperation) 5.6 
7  Cherry  3.8 
8  Brilliance Auto  3.0 
9  Hafei Automobile Group  2.4 
10  Geely Holding Group  2.4 
 
 
Table 3 Summary statistics for households’ income and annual vehicle miles travelled 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
Household income 
(RMB yuan) 
7809 6.65 2.37 1 12 
Annual mileage 
(kilometers) 
7809 22096.02 13717.84 2880 105000 
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Table 4 Summary statistics for key product characteristics and sale 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
Horsepower 
(kw) 1297 92.19 33.44 26.50 257.00 
Displacement 
(liters) 1297 1.90 0.62 0.80 4.70 
Weight (kg) 1297 1342.23 297.34 645.00 2590.00 
Fuel 
Consumption 
(litres/100km) 
1297 6.94 1.96 3.60 21.70 
American 1297 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Japanese 1297 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Korean 1297 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
European 1297 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Sale 1297 2335.30 2751.26 12.00 19185.40 
Price (yuan) 1297 168454.80 123311.70 28800.00 856300.00 
 
 
Table 5 Interval scales for household income 
M1 What is your monthly household income before tax? (RMB) 
1.   2,000 or below 2.   2,001-3,000  
3.   3,001-4,000 4.   4,001-5,000 
5.   5,001-6,000 6.   6,001-8,000 
7   .8,001-10,000 8.   10,001-15,000 
9.   15,001-20,000 10.  20,001-50,000 
11.  50,001-80,000 12.  80,000 or above 
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Table 6 Estimates of the full model 
 
Variables 
Utility function 
( , , )    
Marginal cost function 
( )  
Mean    
Constant -23.3938** (3.9116) 
-15.6213** 
(3.6280) 
Power 0.0263** (0.0063) 
0.0075** 
(0.0009) 
Weight 2.5476** (0.6906) 
2.4769** 
(0.5055) 
Gas expenditure -1.0251** (0.2701) 
 
Fuel consumption  -0.3561** (0.0890) 
Price -0.3894** (0.0895) 
 
American 1.2617** (0.1678) 
0.4462** 
(0.0813) 
Japanese 1.3903** (0.1718) 
0.5110** 
(0.0779) 
Korean 0.4670* (0.2246) 
0.3976** 
(0.0770) 
European 1.5093** (0.1979) 
0.7267** 
(0.1056) 
Standard deviation of 
idiosyncratic tastes 
   
Power 0.0010 (0.0100) 
 
Weight 0.0015 (0.1216) 
 
Gas expenditure 0.0011 (0.1349) 
 
Price -0.1105** (0.0306) 
 
Interactions with household 
income 
   
Price 0.0013 (0.0014) 
 
Note: * and ** indicate 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. In bracket are the standard errors.  
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Table 7  Summary of price changes due to tax adjustments 
 
Fuel 
consumption 
category 
(liters/100km) 
# of car 
models 
Price changes due to 
(%) 
Total sale changes due to 
(%) 
Consumption 
tax 
Fuel tax Consumption 
tax 
Fuel tax 
(0,5] 18 -0.6192 0.3272 0.98 -22.68 
(5,6] 57 -0.4657 0.1983 1.18 -21.92 
(6,7] 74 -0.2341 0.1225 0.44 -21.51 
(7,8] 54 0.0212 -0.1297 -0.14 -20.48 
(8,max) 49 1.8531 -0.2305 -1.19 -18.31 
 
Table 8 Impacts of consumption and fuel tax 
(FT, 
CT)a 
Mean fuel 
consumption 
Total fuel 
consumption
Firm 
profit 
Consumer 
surplus 
Consumption 
Tax 
Fuel 
tax 
Social 
welfarec
(liters/100km) (10 billion 
liters) 
( unit: RMB 10 billions ) 
(1,0)b 6.6612 5.9563 1.8612 3.4204 0.3163 .1310 5.5979
(0,0) 6.6264 7.5581 2.2891 4.2274 0.3911 -- 6.9076
(0,1) 6.6071 7.5744 2.2791 4.2075 0.4206 -- 6.9072
Note: a. FT – fuel tax, CT – consumption tax; b. the binary variable indicates whether a tax is imposed: 1 yes, 0 no. 
c. since fuel tax is a transfer from consumers to government, so it is not included in social welfare.  
 
Figure 1  The joint-venture structure for the major auto manufacturers 
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Figure 2(a) Percentage price changes due to consumption tax adjustment by fuel 
consumption levels
 
Figure 2(b) Percentage price changes due to fuel tax adjustment by fuel consumption 
levels 
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Figure 3 Tax-inclusive price changes due to consumption tax by displacement 
 
 
Figure 4 Savings of total consumption of fuel due to taxes 
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Figure 5 Lorenz curves for consumption tax and fuel tax 
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